













Climate Change Economics 
 
Paula Tel Hidalgo 
 







  2 
ABSTRACT 
 
Climate change is threatening the world’s future. With oceans filled with plastic, forests 
degrading, loss of biodiversity, and CO2 emissions reaching unprecedented levels, 
humankind still seems not aware of the consequences of its actions. Yet, underdeveloped 
countries are already suffering the impacts of the so-called human-induced global 
warming, despite the emissions not being theirs. In this context, there is growing concern 
as to whether climate change can be breeding conflict, especially in poor economies. 
Given the relevance of this topic, some of the main findings on the field of economics of 
climate change are assessed in this essay, followed by a review of the different positions 
found in the literature regarding the causal link between global warming and conflict. 
Moreover, an empirical exercise is carried out on a subset of African countries to detect 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of climate change has, unfortunately, become a constant on our day-to-day. 
However, there’s still little understanding of the potential consequences this phenomenon 
is likely to provoke on our planet and, in the same vein, to each and every living animal 
on its surface. To begin with, it is important to establish a clear distinction between 
climate and weather, two terms that are usually mixed up. The first one is defined as the 
statistical mean and variability of wind, temperature, humidity and other variables over a 
period of time, and it can have a monthly, yearly or even a broader scope1. Thereby, 
climate change is an alteration on the usual pattern of these statistical measures. 
Nonetheless, this expression is commonly used when the causes of such disturbances are 
human-induced. On the other hand, when talking about the weather we are usually 
referring to the realization of the climatic process for a short period of time2. That is, for 
instance, whether it is sunny or rainy at a certain place.  
 
Despite headlines being dominated by climate change issues over the last years, global 
warming is, by no means, a new phenomenon. Scientists, through analysing indirect 
measures of climate change such as tree rings or glacier lengths, have proven that the 
Earth’s climate has suffered from changes even before the dinosaur’s extinction. 
Nevertheless, prior to the Industrial Revolution, the causes of such disturbances had had 
a natural origin. By that time, atmospheric CO2 concentrations moved between 180 parts 
per million (ppm) during ice ages and 280 ppm during interglacial warm periods (NOAA, 
2013). After this point, human activities have been the potential driver of global warming, 
rising CO2 concentrations by more than a third since the 18th century. 
 
In the last years, humankind has changed its production habits, going from the manual 
and artisan work to the massive industries where fossil fuel burning is a constant. 
Moreover, people have moved from the countryside to big cities, a fact that has 
contributed to an increase in production and income. In addition, consumption patterns 
have changed since the manufacturing costs have decreased, leading to the possibility of 
buying at cheaper prices. Regarding mortality, crude death rates have fallen and 
population, in exception of the residents in the least developed countries, have completed 
                                                        
1  Nordhaus, William. Climate Casino, page 37. 
2  Nordhaus, William. Climate Casino, page 37. 
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a demographic transition. Overall, developed countries have experienced a radical change 
of lifestyle which has come along with usage of fossil fuels and its consequent impact on 
the Earth’s system. 
 
Hence, without any doubt, human-induced climate change is one of the biggest challenges 
that humankind has ever faced. Aiming to reduce Greenhouse Gases’ emissions, that is, 
mitigating climate change, must be a priority on the political agenda of every country. 
Unlike other environmental problems, global warming must be tackled globally in order 
to efficiently prevent disastrous consequences. Despite of the uncertainties that surround 
future global warming estimates, cutting down CO2 emissions involves a clear trade-off 
between today’s welfare and the welfare of forthcoming generations. That is, there is a 
price to pay in order to avoid the unforeseeable and disastrous impacts of climate change, 
and the later humankind stops polluting, the worse the world’s prospect will be. Along 
these lines, the current debate is placed on the value that should be given to the so-called 
Social Discount Rate, the parameter that has characterized the controversy between 
Nicholas Stern and William Nordhaus in the last years3.  
 
On the other hand, consensus on some of the consequences of climate change does not 
exist, especially in regards of conflict-related issues, a relatively nascent field on 
economic research. Some authors, such as Edward Miguel, Solomon Hsiang, and 
Marshall Burke argue that climate variability is the cause of social instability, whilst 
others, such as Halvard Buhaug, state that there is not enough empirical evidence to 
support this causal inference.  
 
As an empirical exercise, this essay contains, for a subset of African countries, an analysis 
on whether political violence and droughts are associated. Note that the findings do not 
pretend to infer any causal relationship, as they only assess possible correlations between 





                                                        
3  The Social Discount Rate is a crucial parameter to determine whether it is necessary 
to delay or to accelerate climate change policies. It measures how population value the 
future’s wellbeing relative to the present’s welfare.  
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2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
2.1. Greenhouse Effect, Global Warming, And Climate Change 
 
Understanding global warming implies understanding that the temperature of our planet 
lies upon a balance of incoming and outgoing solar energy4. In broad terms, if this energy 
is absorbed by the Earth’s system, the planet will warm up. Likewise, if the absorbed 
energy from the Sun is released back, the Earth will cool down. Thus, the constant 
increase on temperature registered on our planet is a clear signal of a global-scale 
disequilibrium, that is, the Earth is receiving more sunlight than it is releasing heat back 
to space. As a consequence, its surface has been heating up over the last century, a fact 
that has been translated into an increase of 0.9ºC compared to the temperatures registered 
a hundred years ago5. In addition, each decade since the last thirty years has been warmer 
than the previous one6. Overall, the ongoing global warming is undeniable.  
 
The factors that give rise to climate change can be both natural and human, including 
variations in the sun’s energy, changes in the reflectivity of the Earth’s atmosphere and 
surface, and CO2 emissions. Those factors, also named forcing mechanisms or radiative 
forcings, are the causes of the unbalances between incoming and outgoing energy and 
they can either be positive (if they warm the Earth’s surface up) or negative (if they cool 
the planet down)7. Furthermore, radiative forcings are affected by climate change 
feedbacks which can diminish or amplify the initial forcing. These feedbacks comprise, 
among others, the heat released by organic matter when it decomposes as a response to 
the melting of the frozen soil they lie on, the permafrost8. 
 
Nowadays, what it is believed to be cause for climate change is the human contribution 
in increasing the so-called Greenhouse Effect, a process by which the atmosphere, a layer 
of gases that surrounds the Earth, traps solar radiation and, consequently, warms the 
                                                        
4  Wolfson, R. (2015). Energy Environment and Climate, 2nd ed. New York, U.S.A: 
 Norton, 2012. 
5  See, for example, IPCC Climate Change Synthesis Report (2014), page 40. 
6  CO2 Earth (2019). Retrieved from: https://www.co2.earth/global-warming-update 
 (visited: 30/04/2019) 
7  Ramaswamy, V. (2018). Radiative Forcings of Climate Change, page 353. 
8  Stenhouse, K. and Donev, J. (2016). Positive climate feedback. University of Calgary. 
Retrieved from: https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Positive_climate_feedback 
(visited: 20/03/2019) 
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planet’s surface9. More specifically, this phenomenon is the result of the clustering of 
certain gases on the atmosphere, which block heat from escaping and remain there, at 
least semi-permanently. Those gases, known as Greenhouse Gases (GHGs), keep our 
planet warm enough to sustain life by sharing the capacity of absorbing solar radiation. 
Nonetheless, the current global warming is due to the increasing amount of GHGs in the 
atmosphere. These gases are, mainly10: 
 
1. Carbon dioxide (CO2), the most long-lived gas forcing global warming which, in 
addition, accounts for over 75% of the global GHGs emissions11. It is released to 
the atmosphere through human activities such as deforestation, degradation of 
soils and fossil fuels’ burning.  
 
2. Methane (CH4), a hydrocarbon gas emitted through human activities such as 
natural gas and coal’s production and transportation. It comes from natural 
sources and it is much less abundant than CO2 on the atmosphere, but it is 
considered to be far more active than the latter.  
 
3. Nitrous oxide (N2O). It is a powerful gas produced by agricultural activities such 
as soil cultivation practices, along with fossil fuel combustion and biomass 
burning.  
 
4. Chlorofluorocarbons, which are synthetic compounds of industrial origin. 
Nowadays, the production and release of these gases are highly regulated due to 
their powerfulness.  
 
5. Water vapor (H2O vapor). A high concentration of this GHG leads to a large 
absorption of longwave radiations, which are emitted back to the Earth’s surface. 
This process contributes to increasing global warming.  
 
                                                        
9  Retrieved from the Department of the Environment and Energy of the Australian 
 Government webpage. See: https://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/climate-
 science-data/climate-science/greenhouse-effect (visited on 25/01/2019)  
10  Retrieved from the US Environmental Protection Agency webpage. See: 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases (visited on 11/12/18). 
11  Retrieved from the US Environmental Protection Agency webpage. See:  
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data (visited on 
24/01/2019). 
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Evolution of CO2 emissions 
 
Figure 1 includes the long-term evolution of global CO2 emissions. In the figure we can 
appreciate a clear overall positive and significant trend since 1900, even if we see periods 
of faster and slower growth of emissions. 
 
Figure 1: Global CO2 emissions (1900-2014) 
 
Source: Author’s creation. Data: CDIAC (2019) 
 
The deterministic trend of any time series can be estimated by running a regression of the 
series with respect to time. In this case, the following regression has been estimated: 
 ln(𝐶𝑂2	𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠.) = 	𝛽2 +	𝛽4 ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 +	𝑢.     (1) 
 
The results of the estimation indicate that we are persistently increasing our CO2 
emissions by 2,6% per year, whilst contributing to enlarge the Greenhouse Effect and the 




                                                        
12   Appendix-1 includes the regression used to estimate this trend. 
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Evolution of CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere 
 
Data on atmospheric CO2 concentrations have been collected systematically since the late 
fifties in Mauna Loa, an observatory located on the top of a volcano in the big island of 
Hawaii13. The plot of the Mauna Loa records, represented below in Figure 2, is considered 
the very first significant evidence of global warming, and it is a symbol of the 
anthropogenic impact on the planet. The curve plotted in the abovementioned figure is 
known as the Keeling Curve, in honour of Charles David Keeling. Seventy years ago, the 
notion of climate change did not exist, as it was unclear to what extent the increase on the 
CO2 levels could be the result of the burning of fossil fuels which, at their turn, could lead 
to global warming. Nonetheless, Charles David Keeling, the American geochemist who 
started monitoring the trends of such concentrations in the above-mentioned volcano, was 
determined to demonstrate that the CO2 concentrations were following an overall upward 
trend, accompanied by the seasonal cycle of growth and decompose of plants.  
 
Figure 2. Evolution of CO2 concentrations in Mauna Loa, 1958:03 – 2018:11  
 
Source: Author’s creation. Data: NASA (2019) 
                                                        
13  See Earth System Research Laboratory, https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/obop/mlo/ 
(visited 12/12/18). 
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Likewise, the trend and the seasonality components of the time series data on CO2 
concentrations in the atmosphere are shown in Figure 214.  
 
The seasonal component in the data collected in Mauna Loa is explained by the growth 
and decay of plants. This behaviour is consistently described by the plants’ absorption of 
CO2 during summer and spring, when the seasonality reaches its maximum peak, and the 
respiration and oxidation process during the rest of the year. This phenomenon is clearly 
illustrated if we plot just the monthly evolution of CO2 concentrations for a couple of 
years, as shown in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 3. Seasonality of the CO2 concentrations, January 2016-January 2018 
 
Source: Author’s creation. Data: NASA (2019) 
 
 
The plot clearly illustrates how the months of April, May and June are the ones with the 
highest concentrations of CO2, oppositely to September and October. Nonetheless, the 
terrestrial biosphere is estimated to absorb only one-fourth of the anthropogenic CO2 
                                                        
14  Any time series data, that is the values that a variable takes over time which is 
chronologically plotted, is composed by the trend (the long-term pattern of the series), 
the seasonal and/or the cyclical variation (the regular fluctuations over a period of 
time), and the irregular component. These components can be combined in different 
ways, but it is usually assumed that they are multiplied or added. 
  11 
emissions, whilst oceans are estimated to absorb the same percentage. Thus, the 
remaining 50% of the CO2 emissions is fostering the Greenhouse Effect15. Likewise, 
recent studies show that, as the Earth warms up, the plants absorb less CO216. 
 
In order to remove the monthly variation from the time series, the following regression is 
estimated17,18. 
 𝐶𝑂2. = 	∑ 𝛽29𝑑9,.4<9=4 +	𝑢.                                         (2) 
 
Where i represents the months, starting with 1 for January and 12 for December, and the 
di,t is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the observation corresponds to month i 
and 0 otherwise. Correspondingly, each 𝛽2	9 will represent the expected level of CO2 
concentrations in the atmosphere for month i19.  
 
Estimation of regression (2) can be used to remove the seasonal component from the 
original series. It is important to mention that all the coefficients of the dummy variables 
are significant in a 95% confidence interval20. Notice that the predicted values of the CO2 
concentrations, 𝐶𝑂2>.,	account only for its seasonality. Accordingly, the corresponding 
residuals will account for the other components of the time series excluding seasonality. 
That is: 
 𝐶𝑂2.∗ = 	𝐶𝑂2. −	𝐶𝑂2.>                                                   (3) 
 
                                                        
15  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2019). Ocean-Atmosphere CO2 
exchange. Retrieved from: https://sos.noaa.gov/datasets/ocean-atmosphere-co2-
exchange/ (visited: 01/06/2019). 
16  For further discussion, see: Green et al (2019). Large influence of soil moisture on 
long-term terrestrial carbon uptake, Nature vol.565: 476-479. 
17  Appendix-2.1 includes the estimated coefficients of regression (2). 
18  In order to remove the seasonality of a time series, other methods can be used. For 
example, applying a moving average of length twelve. This would imply that, to 
calculate the average value for a certain month, an average of the six previous months 
and an average for six following months has to be computed.  
19  Notice that the constant regressor has been removed from the regression in order to 
avoid perfect collinearity issues. 
20  See Appendix-2.2. for more information on the confidence intervals. 
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Notice that the way series CO2t* has been constructed the series will have mean 0, as we 
have removed all the monthly averages21. Thus, if we want to properly restore the original 
mean, we will have to add the overall mean of the CO2 concentrations. This method is 
called rebenching. Then, the rebenched series, CO2**, where monthly seasonality has been 
removed is: 
 𝐶𝑂2.∗∗ = 	𝐶𝑂2.∗ + 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐶𝑂2)                                         (4) 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the rebenched series of Mauna Loa records from 1958 to 2018. 
 
Figure 4. CO2 concentrations without seasonality component, March 1958 - November 
2018 
 
Source: Author’s creation. Data: NASA (2019) 
 
To clearly compare the observed time series with the series with the seasonality removed, 
Figure 5 has been graphed for the years comprised between 2010 and 2018. 
 
                                                        
21  Notice that series CO2* is the vector of least squares residuals from regression (1), 
and by numerical properties of least squares estimation, we know that the sum of all 
OLS residuals is 0. 
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Figure 5. CO2 concentrations versus the series without seasonality, January 2010 - 
January 2018  
 
Source: Author’s creation. Data: NASA (2019) 
 
 
Regarding the trend, the series shows a global and persistent increase on the CO2 
concentrations in the atmosphere over time. As explained above, a deterministic trend 
can be estimated using linear regression model. To check whether these concentrations 
follow a linear or a non-linear trend, the following linear regression was estimated22:  
 𝐶𝑂2. = 	𝛽2 +	𝛽4𝑡 +	𝛽<𝑡< +	𝑢.                                    (5) 
 
 
The estimation of model (5) indicates the presence of a significant non-linear trend, with 
a positive estimate for the coefficient of the quadratic time trend, implying that CO2 
concentrations have been increasing at a higher rate, that is, have been increasing 
exponentially.   
 
Graphically, we can see in Figures 6 (A) and (B) that a non-linear trend fits better to the 
plotted data from Mauna Loa. 
                                                        
22  The result of estimating this model is found in Appendix-3. 
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Emissions and economic activity 
 
What is the cause of the rise of greenhouse gases’ emissions? If we stop to think for a 
minute about the consumption decisions that we take on a daily basis, we will realize that 
most of them involve CO2 emissions: taking the car, turning the heating on in winter or 
taking a shower, for instance. Indeed, about 90% of the energy we use comes from fossil 
fuels which emit CO2 when they are burnt, whilst enlarging the existent Greenhouse 
Effect23. Thus, the starting point of all these emissions seems to lay nowhere but in 
humans. Sadly enough, we can’t stop using this type of energy from one day to the other, 
as the renewable sources still require a great investment in order to be fully implemented 
in our society.  
 
Nonetheless, it is important to underline that growth of global CO2 emissions has been 
lower than world's economic growth, as shown in Figure 7. This phenomenon, known as 
decarbonisation, implies that we progressively need less energy derived from CO2 to 
produce the same quantity of output24. The reasons hidden behind decarbonisation are 
diverse and comprise, among others, the ongoing shift from traditional energy sources 
(such as coal) to renewable or less carbon-intensive sources. 
 












Source: Author’s creation. Data: NASA (2019) and World Bank (2019) 
                                                        
23  Nordhaus, William. Climate Casino, page 20. 
24  Nordhaus, William. Climate Casino, page 22. 
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When breaking down the emissions of Greenhouse Gases, GHGs, by the economic 
activities that lead to their creation, we find that the electricity and heat production sector 
accounts for one-fourth of the total emissions. Alongside, agriculture, forestry, and other 
land usage activities account for more than 20% of the total emissions25. Another sector 
that largely contributes to global warming is the one composed by the industries which 
require burnt fossil fuels as an energy source; that is, chemical, metallurgical and mineral 
transformation activities. Overall and exemplifying, activities such as deforestation, 
livestock farming, the use of fertilizers and the burning of coal, oil, and gas, are fostering 
GHGs emissions26. 
 
Figure 8. Evolution of carbon intensity divided by income levels27,28, 1960-2014 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation. Data: World Bank (2019) 
                                                        
25  The United States Environmental Protection Agency. See: 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data (visited 
30/04/2019)  
26  The United States Environmental Protection Agency. See: 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data (visited 
30/04/2019)  
27  Carbon intensity is measured by the ratio of kilograms of carbon dioxide per kilograms 
of oil equivalent energy units.  
28  According to the World Bank Atlas method, for the current 2019 fiscal year, low-
income countries are those with an annual Gross National Income per capita of 995$ 
or lower; middle-income countries’ GNI per capita ranges from $996 to $12.055 and 
high-income economies have a GNI per capita of $12.056 or higher. 
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The ratio of carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy is called carbon intensity. Its 
evolution is plotted in Figure 8. Emission intensities are a way to compare environmental 
impacts of fuels and economic activities. In this graph, we can see that the overall world’s 
carbon intensity use has followed a negative trend, yet when splitting the planet in regions 
according to their income, a different conclusion is inferred29,. Concretely, high-income 
countries have reduced their carbon intensity, while middle-income countries have almost 
doubled such ratio from 1960 to 2014. Low-income countries, on the other hand, have a 
carbon intensity use of approximately the half of high-income economies. 
 
At a country-level, China and the United States are the countries with the largest CO2 
emissions. Nonetheless, when taking a look at the emissions per capita, Bahrain (73.1 
MtCO2) and Qatar (41.9 MtCO2) were heading the list in 2014. Figure 9 shows, for 188 
countries, the positive association between income per capita and emissions per capita. 
 
















Source: Author’s creation. Data: World Bank (2019) 
 
                                                        
29  Appendix-4 includes the regression to estimate this trend. 
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Concretely, the estimated elasticity indicates that countries with a 1% larger income per 
capita are expected to generate 1.14% more emissions, on average. Thereby, richest 
countries are, on average, the ones that emit the most GHGs30. To obtain these results, 
the following regression has been computed: 
 
 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎<24H) = 	𝛽2 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑂2	𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎<24H) +	𝑢.      (6) 
 
 
2.2. Effects Of Climate Change On The Environment  
 
Regardless of the contribution of each gas behind climate change, it is important to notice 
that, overall, they all cause severe damages to societies and to the environment. However, 
the severity of such impacts depends on the system that is affected. That is, whether a 
managed system, also called human-intervened, is harmed, or whether an unmanaged 
system results damaged31. Thereby, the degree of human intervention placed on each 
system will potentially determine the extent of the damage caused by global warming. 
 
Naturally, fundamental concerns are placed on unmanaged systems and on the so-called 
tipping points. The latter are discontinuities in climate behaviour that lead the natural 
system to a new state, probably resulting in an irreversible bad equilibrium. Often, their 
behaviour is based on self-reinforcing processes that, at some highly unpredictable point, 
when such process is tipped, can continue without additional forcing32. Hence, tipping 
points are critical thresholds from which the climate changes from a stable state to a worse 
one, whilst representing the physical, biological and economic impacts of climate change.  
 
The main causes of the tipping points are nonlinear reactions to stresses, and we are far 
from understanding these dynamics33. Furthermore, and even if we understood those 
dynamics, the difficulty to assess the impacts and the gravity of the consequences is much 
larger. Examples of systems that may be subject to tipping points comprise the loss of the 
                                                        
30  See the Appendix-5 for the estimated regression. 
31  Nordhaus, William. Climate Casino, page 71. 
32  Postdam Institute for Climate Research. See: https://www.pik-
potsdam.de/services/infodesk/tipping-elements (visited 29/03/2019) 
33  Nordhaus, William. Climate Casino, page 136. 
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Greenland Ice Sheet, which is rapidly melting due to the current temperature increase34. 
Consequently, it is becoming thinner, it is losing height and, as its surface sinks, it is 
increasingly exposed to warmer air, a fact that accelerates the melting process. Scientifics 
have indicated that the tipping point leading to a complete loss of the Greenland’s ice 
sheet could be reached if the planet’s temperature rises by 2ºC. 
 
On the other hand, unmanaged systems, that largely operate with barely any human 
intervention, are considered to be the most affected systems by global warming. These 
comprise, for example, wildlife reserve and the sea-level rise. The latter is the 
consequence of the melting of glaciers and ice sheets, occurrences derived from the 
human-induced climate change. The Polar Arctic Circle, for instance, has melted faster 
in the last 20 years than in the last 10.000, but we are still not noticing the full extent of 
its consequences in the sea level rise. Nonetheless, in the period comprised between 1900 
and 2016, the sea level rose about 16 to 21 cm, and approximately 7 cm of such increase 
on the sea-level have occurred since 199335 .  
 
Thus, regarding the sea-level rise, the major challenge relies on predicting which will be 
the thermal expansion and whereas the 4% of the population living in coastline areas, 
such as the Netherlands and Bangladesh, will have to migrate. However, it is important 
to notice that the barriers of adaptation to such occurrence will be different in both places. 
Despite of the two countries being partially surrounded by the sea, the Netherlands, a 
fully developed state that can afford to build dykes in order to avoid, or at least to 
postpone, catastrophes derived from the sea-level rise, will have an easier adaptation to 
the sea-level rise than Bangladesh, a country where 20% of the population lives in 
extreme poverty36.  
 
In the same vein, the increasingly urbanised coasts of Somalia and Kenya are clearly 
threatened by floods, which can destroy critical infrastructures, contaminate the few 
                                                        
34  Robinson, A., Calov, R. & Ganopolski, A. Multistability and critical thresholds of the 
Greenland ice sheet. Nat. Clim. Chang. 2, 1–4 (2012). 
35  USGCRP (2017). “Climate Science Special Report. Chapter 12: Sea Level Rise”. 
Retrieved from: https://science2017.globalchange.gov/chapter/12/ (visited: 
30/03/2019) 
36  Barne, Donna (2016). World Bank. Retrieved from: 
https://blogs.worldbank.org/es/voices/celebran-notable-descenso-de-la-pobreza-en-
bangladesh (visited: 31/03/2019) 
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existing freshwater supplies and reduce the potentially fertile land37. Given the large 
number of inhabitants in such areas, sea-level rise would result in catastrophic 
consequences to these countries, probably leading to a large displacement of population 
which, at the same turn, could conduct to disputes for food and housing. Overall, the more 
economic difficulties and the higher the political instability, the more difficult it will be 
for a country to adapt to such event, and the worse will be the consequences for its 
inhabitants.  
 
Another dimension that should be taken into account when talking about the oceans is 
their process of carbonization and acidification, as it is impossible, at least by now, for 
humankind to intervene in this natural cycle. The increase in CO2 in the sea is likely to 
result in species extinction, concretely in oysters, plankton, coral and shellfish. However, 
we do not have a full understanding of the impacts of ocean acidification and it's still 
difficult to assess the potential consequences it will have on humans. Even so, what’s 
clear is that, through ocean acidification, the global fish stock will migrate to non-
contaminated areas and part of it will die on the way. This process will increase the 
likelihood of international conflicts, especially in those sectors dedicated to fishery, as 
the scarce fish will move to neighbour waters, thus reducing economic and income 
opportunities in the local region. 
 
In the same way, hurricanes, or tropical cyclones, are another example of an 
unmanageable system which is tremendously affected by climate change. For such a 
phenomenon to take place, warm water (at a temperature of 26.5ºC in the surface, at least) 
and strong wind are needed. Thus, the conditions for the existence of hurricanes are idyllic 
under the current global warming. In addition, statistics show that damages derived from 
tropical cyclones have risen about 2% per year faster than GDP38. Moreover, calculations 
exhibit that an increase in temperature of 4ºC would enlarge the average intensity of 
hurricanes at about 16 miles per hour. Incentives should be placed, then, in relocation and 
orderly planning as a way to reduce the vulnerability towards such event. 
 
Yet, even if there is some uncertainty about whether and when the consequences of 
climate will occur, it is even more difficult to assess the future economic impact they 
                                                        
37  Werrell, C. and Femia, F. (2018). Climate change raises conflict concerns. The 
UNESCO Courier. 
38  Nordhaus, William. Climate Casino, page 117. 
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might have on biodiversity. Indeed, climate change is considered to be the primary cause 
of the loss of biodiversity (IPBES 2019). The usage of fossil fuels is destroying forests, 
contaminating seas, and hindering the living of animals. Nowadays, one million species 
are under threat of extinction, and we are still undermining the place where they, and we, 
live in. Nonetheless, as animals do not carry a monetary price tag, it is really difficult to 
value, in economic terms, the potential loss of wildlife.  
 
Although one cannot compare the value of a living animal with cultural heritage or 
settlements, both are threatened by the current global warming and they do not have a 
monetary value assigned. Notwithstanding, if population really cares about animals, why 
are seas filled up with disposable plastic? On the other hand, how valuable is for the 
humanity that cities such as Venice or London may disappear? The answer to these 
questions is, at the very least, challenging.  
 
When analysing the impacts of climate change on manageable systems, agriculture and 
farming must be mentioned as they are the most dependent and sensitive economic sector 
to climatic processes. Although global warming is likely to decline soil moisture and to 
reduce the availability of water for irrigation purposes, projections show an increase in 
agricultural productivity in many regions for “modest warming” (a local increase of 
3ºC)39. Given the uncertainties that surround the estimates, what’s certain is that possible 
harmful impacts can be mitigated with carbon fertilization, trade, and a decline of the 
share of agriculture in the economies. As a matter of fact, despite the increase in 
temperatures, technological change has contributed to the 3% decline per year in food 
price. 
 
Nonetheless, water and food are largely indispensable for survival. Thus, the resulting 
water scarcities and the difficulties of accessing to food derived from climate change will 
contribute to people increasingly questioning their security, their lives and their 
prosperity. If individuals’ basic needs are not covered, that is, if their demand for basic 
resources such as housing, water and food, is not satisfied, conflict will likely arise. Sadly 
enough, tensions derived from these situations are already happening in the Middle East 
and Africa. Overall, a stable institutional framework is needed in order to slow down the 
risks of conflict and social instability resulting from global warming. 
                                                        
39  IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2014), page 54. 
  22 
 
Likewise, climate change is also having an impact on health, especially concerning the 
spread of certain diseases, malnutrition, and diarrheal illnesses. In extreme cases, global 
warming, through increased heatwaves, is likely to have a direct impact on mortality40. 
Nonetheless, the methods used to estimate the impact that climate change will have on 
health are highly controversial. However, what can be stated is that, as income is rising, 
the degree of vulnerability against climate change is decreasing in the health and 
agriculture sector. In other words, we are progressively isolating our communities from 
the detrimental impacts of climate change. 
 
Unfortunately, global warming cannot be mitigated from one day to the another. Its direct 
effects on managed and unmanaged systems, going from floods to heat waves and 
comprising the consequent decrease on basic resources, are likely to lead to social 
disruptions. Food and water insecurities can give rise to socio-political issues, whilst the 
predicted increase of extreme events can call into question the state’s resilience against 
global warming. As a consequence, the risk of internal terrorism is enlarged and, as the 
government is less able to meet the basic needs of its society, revolutions and conflicts 
are more likely to appear. 
 
 
2.3. Climate Change: Evidence And General Consensus 
 
Among the climate science experts, there’s a 97% of consensus (NASA, 2019) that 
anthropogenic emissions are the main cause of global warming, at least since 195041. That 
is, 9.7 out of 10 scientists agree on the fact that the current climate change is human-
induced. Indeed, in a report of 2014 published by the prestigious Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPPC), an organisation where the pioneer scientists in global 
warming work, the 100% of the responsibility of climate change was attributed to 
humans42. Nonetheless, sceptics can still be found and especially in America, where only 
two out of six people support the scientific consensus. Most of the dismissive arguments 
                                                        
40  Bowles, D. C., Butler, C. D., & Morisetti, N. (2015). Climate change, conflict and 
health. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 108(10), 390–395.  
41  Nuccitelli, D. Trump thinks scientists are split on climate change. So do most 
Americans. The Guardian 22/10/2018. 
42  In a 5% confidence level. 
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placed against the compelling evidence of global warming comprise political ideologies, 
and the vast majority of such population is completely disengaged from the problem. 
 
Climate change is placed in the political agenda since 2015, when the Paris Agreement 
was signed. In that conference, the United Nations reached an agreement to tackle climate 
change, requiring all member countries to work together in key aspects such as limiting 
the increase of the planet’s temperature below 2ºC compared to industrial levels 
(idyllically aiming for 1.5ºC), pursuing domestic policies to mitigate global warming 
whilst minimizing its adverse losses and damages, and raising public awareness, among 
others43. Indeed, climate action is in the list of sustainable development goals to be 
achieved by 2030. 
 
Likewise, the IPCC published a special report in October 2018 concerning the world’s 
temperature target. In their review, they study the impacts of rising emissions to 1.5ºC 
above preindustrial levels instead of limiting them to 2ºC.  Certainly, half a degree of 
difference can make a large and palpable difference in our ecosystems, whilst slowing 
down the frequency of extreme events, securing food and ensuring life to threatened 
biodiversity. In order to avoid possible disastrous and irreversible consequences of 
climate change, we would have to cut down the emissions of GHGs by 45% by 2030 
compared to the levels of 2010, and by 2050 our emissions should be zero. 
 
The evidence that supports the presence of climate change comprises the global 
temperature rise since the late 19th century, being the temperature of the Earth’s surface 
0.9ºC higher than one hundred years ago. Nonetheless, global warming differs across the 
globe44. What is even more alarming, if possible, is that the temperature’s rise has mostly 
happened in the last 35 years, being the heat waves registered in this period completely 
unprecedented45. Consequently, oceans have absorbed a part of this warmth, increasing 
                                                        
43  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2019). Retrieved from: 
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/what-is-the-paris-
agreement (visited 25/02/2019) 
44  For example, in the case of Spain, the temperature has increased 1.5ºC in the same 
period of time, believed to be causing desertification in some areas of the territory and, 
following the UN statistics, 6% of the Spanish surface is irreversibly degraded. 
45  NASA (2019). Climate change: how do we know? Retrieved from: 
https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/ (visited 26/02/2019). 
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the temperature of their surface (approximately 700 meters of depth) by more than 0.4ºC 
in the last fifty years. 
 
Figure 10. Global Surface’s temperature change, 1881-2017 
 
Source: Author’s creation. Data: NASA 
 
Figure 10 shows the relative change of the Earth’s surface temperature with respect to the 
average temperatures registered between 1951 and 1980. The grey line represents the 
observed annual data. In this case, a Locally Weighted Scatterplot Smoothing (LOWESS) 
method of smoothing the series has been used46. Despite the movements of the series, it 
can be stated that since mid-sixties it has had an overall upward trend. Finally, it should 
be pointed out that eighteen of the nineteen warmest years have taken place since 2001. 
Hence, global warming seems undeniable. 
 
Another consequence of climate change is the melting of the Arctic and Antarctic’s ice 
sheets and the glacial retreat occurring in places such as the Alps, the Himalaya, and 
Alaska, for instance. Moreover, studies show that Greenland, for example, has lost an 
average of 286 billion tons of ice per year in the last 25 years and that the snow cover in 
the Northern Hemisphere has largely decreased. 
                                                        
46  The Locally Weighted Scatterplot Smoothing aims to fit simple models to localized 
subsets of the data. 
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In Figure 11 we can appreciate the extent to which the Arctic’s Ice Sheets are declining. 
The data is extracted using the months of September, when ice sheets reach its minimum. 
Overall, the 12,8% decline on their size per decade is alarming47. 
 











Source: Author’s creation. Data: NASA (2019) 
 
One of the consequences of the melting of ice sheets is the rise in the sea level, which has 
increased about 20 centimetres in the last century. The rate at which oceans rise is 
accelerating every year, being the one of the last two decades nearly the double that of 
the last one hundred years. Moreover, oceans are acidifying as a result of CO2 emissions.  
For instance, in European urban areas, where 80% of its population lives, the frequency 
and the exposure to extreme events such as heat waves, rising sea levels, and flooding, 
has increased with climate change. When breaking down the continent by areas, the 
Mediterranean regions are becoming drier than ever, and the central and south are now 
suffering from forest fires and droughts. Furthermore, northern provinces are getting 
remarkably wetter. However, developing countries are the ones who will suffer the most 
the effects of climate change48. Indeed, their economy largely relies on natural resources, 
meaning that most of the population residing in such countries work on the primary sector 
                                                        
47  NASA, 2019. 
48  European Comission (2019). Climate Change consequences. Retrieved from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/change/consequences_en (visited 26/02/2019). 
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and live off it. As it has been explained, agriculture and farming are the most sensitive 
sectors to global warming, and changes in the usual weather patterns can lead to poor 
harvests and to a subsequent food scarcity. Furthermore, conflict in such places is likely 
to arise if the access to basic needs is restricted.  
 
There is no doubt that the uncertainty regarding how climate will change makes the study 
of global warming even more complicated. Actually, we do not know how climate change 
will evolve because its complex nature makes it difficult for experts to anticipate its 
behaviour. In addition, the uncertainty regarding future policies’ outcomes, the impacts 
of GHGs emissions and the consequences of the forcing mechanisms, the unknown 
tipping points, and the climate and social feedbacks make it even more complicated to 
forecast reliable projections. Nonetheless, it is known how variables such as temperature, 
precipitation, and extreme events have conducted in the last decades. Thus, scientific 
models which allow for past behaviour, and which of course take into account future 
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3. CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONFLICT: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1. Linking Climate Change And Conflict 
 
Will the population living in coastal areas become climate refugees due to sea-level rise? 
Will food and water shortages derived from global warming trigger conflict? Will climate 
change lead to tensions? Many are the questions that arise when studying the potential 
consequences of climate change, and little consensus is found in the literature. 
 
Despite an overwhelming scientific agreement regarding human-induced climate change, 
an accorded resolution on the linkage between global warming and conflict does not exist. 
Indeed, before 2014 there were few and scattered comments on the security issues derived 
from climate change in the most prestigious reports on global warming, the ones 
published by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
Nonetheless, such issue was present in the public debate before 2014. For instance, the 
conflict in the region of Darfur, Sudan, had been linked to climate change by Ban Ki-
moon, the Secretary-General of the UN, who argued that violence in some African 
countries could be a consequence of similar environmental problems49. In the same vein, 
Nicholas Stern argued, in the Stern Review (2006), that forced environmental migration 
could give rise to conflict, however this was not the main focus of his publication. It was 
not until the release of the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report that the UN’s scholars 
introduced a subchapter on “Water, food and human systems, human health, security and 
livelihoods” where it was stated that “multiple lines of evidence relate climate variability 
to some forms of conflict” (IPCC 2014, 73). Thus, the study of the relationship between 
climate change and conflict is relatively nascent, yet the perspective on the issue has 
evolved throughout its analysis.  
 
Nowadays, scholars are debating on the existence of a correlation between climate change 
and conflict and whether or not such relationship follows a causal pathway. Two 
confronting positions can be found in the literature. The first one is defended by Marshall 
Burke, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Edward Miguel, a group of economists from the 
universities of Stanford and Berkeley, in the United States, who argue that global 
                                                        
49  Nordas, R. and Gleditsch, N. (2007). “Climate change and Conflict”. Page: 629 
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warming does induce human conflict. On the other hand, Halvard Buhaug, a professor at 
the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, and his workmates, call into doubt 
such statistical correlation. 
 
Before introducing their arguments, two points must be highlighted. First of all, it is 
important to understand the difficulty in measuring and testing causal relationships 
outside the context of an experiment. Most of the economic data is observational, that is, 
nonexperimental data. In order to properly interpret the results of an analysis that is 
carried out with such type of data, one must bear in mind that it may have selection bias, 
that is, observations may not be representative and they are not always randomly selected. 
In addition, it may contain information bias, that is inaccuracy in reporting the data, and 
measurement errors. Nonetheless, what truly concerns the study of the relationship 
between climate change and conflict is confounding. Such a risk factor when studying 
causation arises when a variable, say X, affects at the same time two other variables, say 
Y and Z, whose association is being tested. Thus, when trying to infer a causal 
relationship between these two variables, if X is not taken into account, the estimated 
relationship between Y and Z is biased. 
 
Thereby, linking climate change and conflict would be simpler if two identical societies 
existed and could be compared. If it were the case, one of the populations would be 
“treated” with a variation in the climatic conditions, such as an increase on the frequency 
of precipitations or a heat wave. Oppositely, the other society would adopt the role of a 
“control group”. That is, as both population groups are assumed to be identical, the 
divergences in the conflict outcomes across populations would be credited to the only 
different factor, the climate variability. Unfortunately, such experiment cannot be carried 
out as no homogeneous societies, nor individuals, exist. Nonetheless, if an experiment is 
to be made, randomisation of treatment is the best way to prevent confounding issues. 
 
Thereby, to isolate the effect of climate change on conflict, two econometrical approaches 
are widely used in the literature; these are cross-sectional and panel data studies. The first 
one consists on comparing how the conflict variable evolves across sites, whilst 
controlling for the variables that covariate with the observed conflict outcomes, as 
economic indicators, and adding them to the regression50. The two main drawbacks of 
                                                        
50  Burke, M., Hsiang, S. and Miguel, E. (2014). Climate and Conflict. Page 4.  
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this method are that population is assumed to be homogeneous and that some drivers of 
conflict, such as religion, are difficult to measure and, consequently, they are hard to be 
controlled. In addition, not all the drivers of conflict are known, and the scholar who uses 
this method is likely to conflate the real effects of climate change with the unknown 
determinants of the studied social instability. 
 
On the other hand, panel data approaches aim to analyse climate variability across time 
within the same population, defining the latter as both the “control” and the “treatment” 
group51. That is, the conflict outcomes are measured, for the same population, before a 
variation in the climate and after that variation Forasmuch as the period of time comprised 
between the events is small, the effect of the climate variable on conflict can be 
interpreted as causal. Nonetheless, and as a consequence, only climate variations that are 
short-run can support this approach. 
 
The other point to be highlighted is that, despite climate change being a world-wide issue, 
societies living in poor countries are the most vulnerable to the impacts of global 
warming. In addition, the study of social systems is inherently complex, as it is really 
difficult, if not impossible, to predict how the population will react to certain stresses. 
However, the differences between developed and underdeveloped countries, in terms of 
their access to basic needs and the design of their institutions, can help us explain the 
divergences on behaviour.  
 
On one hand, survival in poor countries depends on natural resources, as the main 
economic activity for such population is agriculture. Indeed, more than one out of two 
people in underdeveloped countries work in the cultivation of soil and in farming, the 
sector which is the most affected by climate-related variations52. Thereby, as the world is 
becoming warmer, water is increasingly being limited, the harvests are scarcer, and the 
survival of these societies is progressively more threatened. Consequently, climate 
change, by shifting weather patterns, rising the sea level and increasing the world’s 
temperature, among others, is turning their lives into a life or death game, whilst rising 
the likelihood of disputes over basic needs. In addition, climate change is making 
                                                        
51  Burke, M., Hsiang, S. and Miguel, E. (2014). Climate and Conflict. Page 5. 
52  World Bank (2019). Employment in agriculture in underdeveloped countries. See: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=XL (visited: 
30/05/2019). 
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underdeveloped countries more dependent on wealthy societies as, by themselves, they 
do not have the resources to cope efficiently with climate change.   
 
On the other hand, institutions, in wealthy societies, aim to promote peace and are 
composed by democratically chosen politicians. However, poor countries struggle with 
political instability and corruption, which ends up deriving on fragile situations. Indeed, 
in the World Bank’s Development Report (2011), such situations are defined as time 
phases when states or institutions lack the ability or the legitimacy to moderate the 
relations between social groups, consequently leaving the door open for possible conflict.  
 
Thereby, if climate variability hits an economy dependent on agriculture and reduces the 
availability of natural resources, less food and water will be available for the same 
population, and society will try to fight for its survival. In addition, if the political 
institutions are fragile, they won’t be able to solve the conflicts that will likely arise from 
the reduced access to basic needs.  
 
Overall, developed countries have the skills and the resources to cope with climate change 
impacts in a more peaceful manner than underdeveloped states. That is a reason why 
conflict is measured differently according to the location that is studied, as it is explained 
in the following chapter. 
 
Going back to the linkage between climate change and conflict, the group of American 
economists composed by Hsiang, Burke and Miguel argue that, despite climate variability 
not being the only causal factor of conflict, it can certainly alter the interactions between 
individuals, whilst modifying the frequency and the intensity of social instability. To infer 
the causal relationship between both variables, they use a fixed effects approach jointly 
with the use of country time trends and binary dummy variables, which enables them to 
control for the unobserved variables that might affect the conflict outcomes. 
 
They suggest that economic incentives could be a channel through which climate change 
causes conflict53. That is, an alteration on the usual weather patterns may result in worse 
harvests, which could reduce the opportunity cost attached to conflict, whilst rising civil 
                                                        
53  Carleton, T., Hsiang, S. and Burke, M. (2016). Conflict in a changing climate. Page: 
497. 
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unrest. Likewise, they state that climate change, through a psychological pathway, could 
potentially increase the likelihood of conflict. They rely on the fact that serotonin levels, 
a neurotransmitter negatively associated with aggressive behaviour, do fall when 
temperature increases. Thus, global warming has been shown to be linked with a decrease 
on the serotonin levels, which could lead to civil unrest under heat stress. 
 
Buhaug, at his turn, states that the “climate breeds conflict” hypothesis holds only under 
the benchmark used by Hsiang, Burke and Miguel. He argues that, when using different 
climate parameters, such as interannual growth of precipitations, and different controls, 
such as political exclusion, as well as when modifying the dependent variable, for a more 
“inclusive” indicator, that is, that encompasses all conflict years instead of limiting it to 
an amount of deaths in battle, causality disappears54.  
 
Nonetheless, he states that climate change may have an indirect and conditional effect on 
social security, and that climate variability may influence the dynamics of interaction 
between individuals, although he finds little evidence to support this linkage in the short-
term55,56. His approach is based on the fact that extreme weather conditions or adverse 
changes in the usual patterns of temperature or precipitations, for example, may lead to a 
decline on agricultural productivity and/or to crop failure. The economic impacts that 
could arise from this occurrence are diverse, but they can be categorized within four 
events. First of all, if agricultural productivity slows down, access to food can be reduced, 
leading to an increase in the price of the basic commodities. Secondly, farmers could 
experience a loss on their income derived from a decline in their sales. Moreover, if the 
state rose money from agriculture by means of taxation or exports, it would also 
experience a loss of its revenues. Last but not least, if the demand for basic needs is not 
covered by the supply-side, the population can decide to move into other places where 
they can have a better prospect. As a consequence of such events, Buhaug states that 
conflict could arise. 
 
Nonetheless, Buhaug argues that the negative effects of climate variability can be 
compensated by technological innovation, and those adverse changes may not lead to a 
                                                        
54  Halvard, B. (2019). Climate not to blame for African civil wars. Pages 16478, 16479. 
55  Halvard, B. (2016). Climate Change and Conflict: Taking Stock. Page 334. 
56  Thiesen, O., Gleditsch, N and Buhaug, H. (2013). Is Climate Change a Driver of 
Armed Conflict? Page 4. 
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decline in agricultural productivity. Thus, the vicious poverty cycle in which some 
countries are involved, especially in the Sub-Saharan region, would disappear. Moreover, 
he argues that for the Middle East and North Africa region (the MENA), the impacts of 
climate variability are different, as these economies do not rely as much upon agriculture 
as poorer economies. The possible effects on these countries comprise the decline in the 
petroleum demand as a result of the progressive shift towards renewable energies, an 
occurrence derived from the burning of fossil fuels and its negative impacts on the 
atmosphere. Moreover, if temperatures increase above a certain threshold, tourism and 
freshwater resources could decline. Likewise, Buhaug states that the MENA context is 
challenging, as the population is growing rapidly, they have high unemployment rates 
and extreme environmental conditions.  
 
3.2. Empirical Evidence 
 
When scholars talk about conflict, they are usually comprising different types of social 
instability. One of them is the interpersonal conflict, which accounts for violent crime, 
domestic violence, property crime, violent retaliation, and murder, among others. Another 
one is the intergroup conflict, which makes reference to an armed conflict between the 
state’s government and an organized rebel movement, or between two social groups. That 
are, political instability, civil wars, and civil conflict, for example. Other types of conflict 
range from institutional breakdown to population collapse.   
 
It is important to notice that scholars differ on the choice of the variable that accounts for 
the climate variability. Most of the studies use data on precipitations and on temperature, 
although the time and the spatial unit can differ. That is, whether it is annual or monthly, 
and whether it is measured at a country-level or at a city-level, for example.  
 
In addition, most of the studies examine the effect of climate variability on conflict in 
underdeveloped countries, especially in the Sub-Saharan region. This territory is 
particularly affected by global warming for many reasons. First, these countries are 
among the ones with the slowest economic growth in the world. Furthermore, they rely 
extensively on agriculture and on rainfall, as they have scarce irrigation mechanisms. 
Thus, as they do not have the resources to cope efficiently with the consequences of 
climate variability, they will be the ones who suffer the most. Overall, due to their 
geographical location, their extreme weather conditions and their level of 
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underdevelopment, this region will most likely bear the burden of climate change, 
although it is, by no means, their fault.  
 
In their papers, the group of economists composed by Hsiang, Burke and Miguel, find a 
strong causal relationship between climate variability and social instability across 
different regions, different time periods and different climatic events57 That is, changes 
in the usual climatic pattern towards more extreme weather directly lead to an increase in 
conflict. In other words, as climate changes, the world becomes more violent. Concretely, 
their findings suggest that the magnitude of the effect of climate on conflict is 
considerable: for each one standard deviation change in climate towards hotter 
temperatures or more intense rainfall, interpersonal conflict rises 4% and intergroup 
violence goes up by 14%, on average58. Nonetheless, these authors do not conclude that 
climate is, and has been, the only driver of human conflict, but that when large climate 
variations occur, human conflict is exacerbated. Likewise, they argue that the existing 
research is still unable to explain the mechanisms through which climate leads to conflict, 
although the evidence consistently points towards a clear causal pathway.   
 
In 2004, Miguel et al., in order to estimate the effect of economic growth on civil conflict, 
used an instrumental variables approach where exogenous rainfall variation was the IV 
for income growth. In addition, they used country fixed effects and coded the dependent 
variable with 1 if at least 1.000 deaths were reported in a specific country.  For the period 
comprised between 1979 and 1999, they found that when there was a decrease in rainfall, 
the likelihood of conflict arose on the following year in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
One year later, Miguel (2005), used local variation on rainfall to assess the effect of 
income shocks on murder. He found that in the countryside of Tanzania, when there were 
periods of extreme rainfall variability, that is droughts or floods, the murder of “witches” 
-elderly women- doubled relative to other years. Moreover, such extreme rainfall was 
related to a decline in agricultural production and a consequent increase in famine.  
 
Burke et al (2009) adjusted the study of Miguel et al. (2004) to control simultaneously 
for temperature and rainfall changes from 1981 to 2002, as both variables are correlated 
                                                        
57  Hsiang, S. and Burke, M. (2013) Climate, Conflict, and Social Stability: What Does 
the Evidence Say?  
58  Hsiang, S., Burke, M. and Miguel, E. (2013). Quantifying the Influence of Climate on 
Human Conflict. Science (341), 1235367. 
  34 
over time. They corroborated the finding from Miguel et al., plus they found that when 
temperature increased, civil war incidence was more likely to happen. Nonetheless, this 
study was criticized by Buhaug (2010), who argued that the definition of civil war used 
by Burke et al. was the cause of the positive correlation between civil war and 
temperature. In addition, Buhaug added a lagged conflict incidence indicator, as he 
argued that recent conflict could influence the probability of new social unrest, and he 
used a logit regression as well as possible interactions between temperature and poverty 
and political exclusion. With these modifications in Burke et al (2009) model, he found 
no casual implications of climate variations on civil war. 
 
Likewise, Hendrix and Glaser (2007) used data on interannual rainfall, land degradation 
and freshwater resources in Sub-Saharan Africa to estimate the impact of short and long-
term climatic variations on social instability, measured as state-based internal armed 
conflict at a national level. As control variables, they used GDP per capita, whether the 
country was an oil producer and the percentage of the country’s mountainous terrain. In 
their article, they studied the effects of climate change as long-term trends that may 
increase the probability of conflict, and as short-term triggers that can also lead to the 
same prospect. They found that an increase in rainfall was followed by a decrease in the 
likelihood of conflict in the next year, and their findings suggest that it was a more 
significant determinant on civil conflict than long-term trends such as land degradation 
and freshwater resources. Nonetheless, no causal relationship was inferred between 
rainfall and armed conflict. 
 
Dell et al. (2012) studied the effects of temperature on economic growth for poor 
countries. They found that a negative correlation between temperature and economic 
growth, and they noticed that higher temperatures also had a negative effect on 
agricultural and industrial production, whilst increasing political instability in poor 
countries. Along similar lines, Sarsons (2011), also arrived at the conclusion that climate 
variability, in his study defined by positive precipitation shocks, lowered the probability 
of riot violence between Hindus and Muslims by 8% on the following year in India. He 
controlled for agricultural wages and his study included district fixed effects. 
Nonetheless, he found no relationship between such shocks and income variability. 
 
Rowhani et al (2011), studied the effect of interannual variability in ecosystems on armed 
conflict and malnutrition in the Republic of Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. They used a 
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nutrition indicator and controlled for the economic activity per regions, whilst finding a 
positive correlation between ecosystem productivity and armed conflict. However, no 
causality was inferred. 
 
Overall, there seems to be a relationship between climate variability and conflict. In 
addition, despite most of the studies being set in Africa, this relationship seems to hold in 
the rest of the world. Nonetheless, there is less evidence on the path that leads from 
climate change to conflict. Some studies find significant associations between climate 
change and economic growth and conflict, respectively, whilst not being able to infer a 
pure causal relationship. Others, as Burke (2009), find a robust causal relationship 
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4. DROUGHTS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE: AN EXERCISE 
 
The previous chapter has illustrated once more how challenging is to measure and test 
causal relationships in the context of nonexperimental data. Usually, we need to just settle 
in measuring and testing implications of causal links between variables. That is, if a given 
theory argues that, say variable Z has a positive effect on variable Y, it might be very 
difficult to use observational data to measure and test such theory. However, we can try 
to measure a testable implication on such theory, which is that there is a positive 
association between Z and Y. This is the type of exercise carried on in this section. 
 
Thereby, an implication of the climate change breeds conflict hypothesis will be tested in 
this chapter. That is, whether or not conflict variables are correlated with climate 
variables. To do so, a data set from Vestby (2019) has been used, which consists on data 
extracted from the Afrobarometer (2016), a survey that is estimated to represent 76% of 
the African population, and from the Standardised Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index 
(SPEI).  The first one is a random study carried out in different districts of 37 African 
countries, which reports participation in political violence. To do so, over 73.000 
randomly chosen citizens had to respond whether they had used force or violence for a 
political cause during the previous year. Notice that the question embraces a broad scope 
of activities, certainly implying illegal acts.  The possible answers they could report were 
“No, would never do this”, “No, but would do if had the chance”, “Yes, once or twice”, 
“Yes, several times”, “Yes, often”, “Don’t know” or “Refuse to answer”.  
 
To facilitate the interpretations, such answers have been compiled into a binary variable 
named Political Violence, which takes value 1 if they did use force for a political cause, 
regardless of the frequency, and 0 if they did not. In addition, when participants 
responded, they were reported their age, their gender, which has been computed as a 
binary variable taking value 1 if the respondent was male and 0 if female, and whether 
they lived in urban or rural areas, a variable that has also been computed as binary, taking 
the value 1 if they lived in rural areas and 0 if they lived in urban settlements. 
 
In regards of the climatic variable, data from the SPEI (2016) has been used. Such 
institution facilitates data of precipitations in geo-localized spots, which allows us to 
know the exact climatic conditions that the respondents faced when they were involved, 
or not, in political violence. Such data has been compiled into two binary variables, which 
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account for the presence of droughts and floods. The first one takes value 1 if drought 
was present during the growing season, and 0 otherwise; the latter, at its turn, takes value 
1 if there were presence of floods, and 0 if not. 
 
Notice that, as we are dealing with binary variables, we cannot estimate the correlation 
between the two them using the usual Pearson correlation coefficient. Instead, Pearson’s 
Chi-square statistic has to be applied.  
 
Association between Conflict Variable and Climatic Variables 
 
First, in order to infer an association between political violence and drought, two 
contingency tables must be computed, that is, two tables that display the frequency 
distribution of both indicator variables. Table 1 disposes the conditional observed 
frequencies and their marginal value. On the other hand, In Table 2, the conditional 
expected frequencies and their respective marginal values are shown.  
 







Source: Author’s creation. Data: Vestby (2019) 
 
 








Source: Author’s creation. Data: Vestby (2019) 
 
                         Political Violence 
Drought 
[0] [1] Row Marginal 
 [0] 55.112 16.399 71.511 
[1] 1.729 728 2.457 
Column Marginal 56.841 17.127 73.968 
 
                        Political Violence 
Drought 
[0] [1] Row Marginal 
 [0] 54.952,9 16.558,1 71.511 
[1] 1.888,1 568,9 2.457 
Column Marginal 56.841 17.127 73.968 
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Once the tables are computed, we carry out a hypothesis test to assess whether or not 
political violence and droughts are associated. Our null hypothesis (H0) states that there 
is no association between the variables, and the alternative hypothesis states the opposite. 
That is: 
 
 I		𝐻2:	𝑛𝑜	𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛		𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛	𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙	𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝐻4: 𝑛𝑜𝑡	𝐻2  
 
 
Under the null hypothesis of no association between political violence and presence of 
droughts, the statistic of contrast follows a Chi-square distribution with one degree of 
freedom. To compute the value of the test-statistic, the formula defined in (7) must be 
used, where fo stands for the observed conditional frequency and fe accounts for the 
expected conditional frequency. That is: 
 											𝑋< = ∑ (RSTURVT)WRVTH9=4 	~	𝑋<(1)                                           (7) 
 
Once we compute the Pearson’s Chi-square statistic with the values from the contingency 
tables, we obtain: 
 
 𝑋< = (55.112 − 54.952,9)<54.952,9 + (16.399 − 16.558,1)<16.558 + (1.729 − 1.888,1)<1.888,1 + (728 − 568,9)<568,9 = 59.883	 
 
 
Moreover, we know that under a Chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom and a 
right-tail probability of 0.01, that is, at a significance level of 1%, the critical value is 
6.6349. Any value which is smaller than the critical value will lay on the acceptance area, 
that is, the null hypothesis will not be rejected. 
 
Nonetheless, notice that when we compute the Pearson’s Chi-square statistic, we obtain 
a value of 59.883, which is way larger than 6.6349. Thus, we must reject the null 
hypothesis of no association between participation in political violence and the presence 
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of droughts. In addition, the p-value equals 1.00668e-14, a value that is way smaller than 
the significance level of 1%. 
 
Hence, an association between participation in political violence and the presence of 
droughts has been found. This means that, on average, when droughts were present during 
growing season in the 37 selected African countries, respondents participated in political 
violence. Notice that we cannot estimate the magnitude of such event, that is, the extent 
to which political violence increased when droughts were present. Nonetheless, we do 
know that such association has very likely existed, as the correlation appears to be 
significant at a 1% of confidence level.  
 
 
Conflict Variable and Climate Variables: Logit model 
 
In addition, a regression analysis has been used in order to measure the association 
between political violence the presence of droughts and floods, controlling for other 
variables available in the data set and that might also be related to political violence. 
These are:  the age, the gender and the geographical living area of the respondents. 
 
Given the binary nature of our conflict variable, a logit model has been used. The 
dependent variable of our model, political violence, embraces a broad scope of activities 
implying illegal acts, and only takes two values, zero and one. Thus, p is defined in a way 
that it will only range within this interval. That is: 
 
 𝑝 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏{𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙	𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 1} = V𝛽0+	𝛽1∗𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡+	𝛽2∗𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑+	𝛽3∗𝐴𝑔𝑒+	𝛽4∗𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟+	𝛽5∗𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛+	𝑢V𝛽0+	𝛽1∗𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡+	𝛽2∗𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑+	𝛽3∗𝐴𝑔𝑒+	𝛽4∗𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟+	𝛽5∗𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛+	𝑢h4              (7) 
 
 
Expression (7) can be written, by applying natural logarithms, in terms of the natural 
logarithm of the odds ratio.  
 
 ln i j4Ujk = 	𝛽0 +	𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 +	𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 	𝛽4 ∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 +	𝛽5 ∗ 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 + 	𝑢	     (8)  
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The climate change breeds conflict hypothesis implies the parameter 𝛽4 to be positive, as 
if the binary variable Drought takes value 1, we would expect the probability of 
participating in violent activities to increase. In addition, the same reasoning can be 
applied to the variable drought. That is, climate change breeds conflict hypothesis 
suggests that the parameter 𝛽< is to be positive, as if the binary variable Flood takes value 
1, we would expect the probability of participating in political violence to increase. 
 
In Table 3, the estimates of the Logit model are shown. The parameters of this model are 
estimated using the maximum likelihood estimator. 
 
 
Table 3. Estimates of the Logit model, where the dependent variable is Political Violence 
 
Model 1: Logit, using observations 1-73968 
 
Dependent variable: Political Violence 
Standard errors based on Hessian 
 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error z Slope* 
Constant −3.61075 0.0517136 −69.82  
Drought 0.346438 0.0452633 7.654 0.0118025 
Flood −0.171053 0.168502 −1.015 −0.00493187 
Age −0.00712996 0.00135585 −5.259 −0.000221837 
Gender 0.361012 0.0417542 8.646 0.0112764 
Urban 0.192534 0.0430710 4.470 0.00588202 
 
 
*Evaluated at the mean 
Number of cases 'correctly predicted' = 71511 (96.7%) 
f(beta'x) at mean of independent vars = 0.179 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(5) = 172.857 [0.0000] 
 
 
Mean dependent var  0.033217 S.D. dependent var  0.179204 
McFadden R-squared  0.008017 Adjusted R-squared  0.007460 
Log-likelihood −10694.63 Akaike criterion  21401.26 
Schwarz criterion  21456.53 Hannan-Quinn  21418.27 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation. Data: Vestby (2019) 
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We know that, under the null hypothesis of an asymptotic z-test, z is normally distributed 
with mean 0 and variance 1. Also, under the null hypothesis, with a two-tailed probability 
of 0.01, that is, at a significance level of 1%, the critical values are -2.575 and 2.575. 
Thus, when contrasting this value to the z-value of Table 3, we can see that the variable 
Drought is statistically significant (7.65>2.57). Under the same reasoning, the variable 
Flood is not significant (-2.57<-1.015<2.57). 
  
Hence, from Table 3 we can infer that the estimate of parameter 𝛽4 is positive and 
significant, thus indicating that the presence of drought in a region is positively associated 
with the probability of participating in political violence 
 
Furthermore, the estimates show that the fact of being a male and of living in rural areas 
is positively associated to political violence. That is, a man is more likely to be involved 
in an act of force or violence for political issues than a woman. At the same time, people 
living in rural areas are positively correlated with political violence. Probably, this fact is 
due to the difference of opportunities and resources between urban and rural areas, and 
to the presence of a weak institutional framework in the later.   
 
On the other hand, the age seems to be negatively associated with the participation in 
violent activities. That is, as the respondent is older, he is less likely to be involved in an 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Undoubtably, climate change will be a major challenge for humanity in the following 
decades. Its effects on unmanageable systems, as well as its inherently complex 
behaviour, make it difficult for economic analysis to properly estimate its costs and 
benefits. Nonetheless, despite the uncertainty surrounding the issue and the difficulty on 
predicting human behaviour, it is nearly undisputed among the scientific community that 
humankind has created this problem by itself. 
 
While it is true that climate change affects, in a larger or a shorter extent, each and every 
region on Earth, not all countries are able to cope efficiently with such impacts. 
Developing countries, that largely rely on natural resources and that are characterised by 
a low and steady economic growth which comes along with a weak institutional 
framework, do not possess the means nor the knowledge to tackle such a problem. In 
addition, as their economies are agriculture-based, if climate change results in a lower 
frequency of precipitations or in heat waves, harvests will be resented. In addition, as 
economic productivity declines, the nations’ output will contract, as well as the 
availability of basic needs, such as food and water. 
 
Notwithstanding, complexity lies on predicting how societies will react to such global 
warming stresses, fundamentally in developing countries, as they are not as immune to 
climate change impacts as wealthy societies. On one hand, Neo-Malthusian theories 
suggest that, as the availability of basic needs is reduced, population will start to fight 
over the remaining resources. Thereby, conflict, by means of civil war, rebel movements 
or crimes, for example, will arise. However, such approach is not fully supported by the 
empirical evidence, which does not stand on a consensual answer regarding the 
relationship between climate variability and conflict outcomes. 
 
Indeed, the difficulty of causally relating climate change to conflict relies on confounding 
issues. Thus, the differences in scientific findings on such relationship derive from the 
assumptions behind the econometrical method used. Notwithstanding, what is easier to 
test are the implications of causation. That is, whether there is or there is not an 
association between conflict outcomes and climate variables. 
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Likewise, the empirical exercise has proven that, for a sample of over 73.000 respondents 
of 37 African countries, the presence of droughts seems to be associated with political 
violence. Moreover, being a male and living in the countryside are also related to this 
type of conflict. Nonetheless, it seems that, as population gets older, they are less likely 
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6. APPENDICES 
 
Appendix-1: Estimating the linear trend of CO2 emissions, 1900-2014 
 
Model 1: OLS, using observations 1900-2014 (T = 115) 
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of CO2 emissions 
HAC standard errors59, bandwidth 3 (Bartlett kernel) 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
constant −49.8072 1.25795 −39.59 <0.0001 *** 
time 0.0265506 0.000638106 41.61 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  2.152349  S.D. dependent var  0.897883 
Sum squared resid  2.569626  S.E. of regression  0.150798 
R-squared  0.972041  Adjusted R-squared  0.971793 
F(1, 113)  1731.262  P-value(F)  2.33e-70 
Log-likelihood  55.38945  Akaike criterion −106.7789 
Schwarz criterion −101.2890  Hannan-Quinn −104.5506 
rho  0.935452  Durbin-Watson  0.131062 
 
 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
 
Confidence interval of the estimates 
 
t(113, 0.025) = 1.981 
 
 Variable Coefficient 95 confidence interval 
constant -49.8072 (-52.2994, -47.3150)   







                                                        
59  Robust standard errors are used to account for the presence of autocorrelation. Given 
that we are analyzing a time series data, it is likely to find a strong presence of 
autocorrelation of the disturbances. Hence, we need to correct the original calculation 
of the standard errors. 
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Appendix-2.1: Estimating the seasonality of Mauna Loa records with dummy variables 
 
Model 2: OLS, using observations 1958:03-2018:11 (T = 729) 
 
Dependent variable: Average Interpolated CO2 Concentrations 60,61 
HAC standard errors62, bandwidth 6 (Bartlett kernel) 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
dm1 353.746 3.51859 100.5 <0.0001 *** 
dm2 354.503 3.51972 100.7 <0.0001 *** 
dm3 354.740 3.52674 100.6 <0.0001 *** 
dm4 356.013 3.53790 100.6 <0.0001 *** 
dm5 356.573 3.54131 100.7 <0.0001 *** 
dm6 355.998 3.52975 100.9 <0.0001 *** 
dm7 354.507 3.50939 101.0 <0.0001 *** 
dm8 352.492 3.50144 100.7 <0.0001 *** 
dm9 350.926 3.50955 99.99 <0.0001 *** 
dm10 350.966 3.53274 99.35 <0.0001 *** 
dm11 352.297 3.55196 99.18 <0.0001 *** 
dm12 352.679 3.50610 100.6 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  353.7872  S.D. dependent var  27.54750 
Sum squared resid  549966.0  S.E. of regression  27.69544 
R-squared  0.004503  Adjusted R-squared -0.010770 
F(11, 717)  1455.595  P-value(F)  0.000000 
Log-likelihood −3449.561  Akaike criterion  6923.121 
Schwarz criterion  6978.221  Hannan-Quinn  6944.381 
rho  0.999870  Durbin-Watson  0.000283 
 
 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level 






                                                        
60  The data is averaged because it is computed with the monthly mean CO2 mole fraction 
determined from daily averages. When values are missing, they have been 
interpolated. That is, they are the result of the sum of the average seasonal cycle value 
and the trend value for the missing month. 
61  Dm accounts for “dummy variable” and the following number represents the month in 
a chronological order, that is: 1 for January, 2 for February, and so on. 
62  Robust standard errors have been used to account for the presence of autocorrelation. 
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Appendix-2.2: Confidence interval of the dummy variables 
 
Confidence interval of the estimates 
 
t(717, 0.025) = 1.963 
 
Variable Coefficient 95% confidence interval 
Dummy variable for January 353.746 (346.838, 360.654) 
Dummy variable for February 354.503 (347.593, 361.413) 
Dummy variable for March 354.740 (347.816, 361.664) 
Dummy variable for April 356.013 (349.067, 362.959) 
Dummy variable for May 356.573 (349.621, 363.526) 
Dummy variable for June 355.998 (349.068, 362.928) 
Dummy variable for July 354.507 (347.617, 361.396) 
Dummy variable for August 352.492 (345.618, 359.367) 
Dummy variable for September 350.926 (344.036, 357.816) 
Dummy variable for October 350.966 (344.031, 357.902) 
Dummy variable for November 352.297 (345.323, 359.270) 
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Appendix-3: Estimating non-linear trend of emissions 1900-2014 
 
Model 3: OLS, using observations 1958:03-2018:11 (T = 729) 
 
Dependent variable: Average Interpolated CO2 emissions 
HAC standard errors63, bandwidth 6 (Bartlett kernel) 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
constant 314.394 0.341117 921.7 <0.0001 *** 
time 0.0651917 0.00238171 27.37 <0.0001 *** 
time squared 8.78692e-05 3.25005e-06 27.04 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  353.7872  S.D. dependent var  27.54750 
Sum squared resid  3563.720  S.E. of regression  2.215560 
R-squared  0.993549  Adjusted R-squared  0.993532 
F(2, 726)  26505.41  P-value(F)  0.000000 
Log-likelihood −1612.826  Akaike criterion  3231.653 
Schwarz criterion  3245.428  Hannan-Quinn  3236.967 




* indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level 

















                                                        
63  Robust standard errors have been used to account for the presence of autocorrelation. 
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Appendix-4: Estimating the trend of the World’s carbon intensity indicator 
 
Model 4: OLS, using observations 1960-2014 (T = 55) 
 
Dependent variable: World’s carbon intensity indicator 
HAC standard errors64, bandwidth 2 (Bartlett kernel) 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
constant 2.80415 0.0532305 52.68 <0.0001 *** 
time −0.00724532 0.00169522 −4.274 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  2.601282  S.D. dependent var  0.155995 
Sum squared resid  0.586491  S.E. of regression  0.105194 
R-squared  0.553682  Adjusted R-squared  0.545261 
F(1, 53)  18.26673  P-value(F)  0.000080 
Log-likelihood  46.83398  Akaike criterion −89.66796 
Schwarz criterion −85.65330  Hannan-Quinn −88.11546 




* indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
















                                                        
64  Robust standard errors have been used to account for the presence of autocorrelation. 
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Appendix-5: Estimating the effect of the GDP per capita on the CO2 emissions per 
capita, 2014 
 
Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-217 (n = 188) 
 
Missing or incomplete observations dropped: 29 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of Emissions per capita (2014) 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −9.90233 0.354540 −27.93 <0.0001 *** 
ln(GDP per capita) 1.14391 0.0378987 30.18 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.712530  S.D. dependent var  1.492389 
Sum squared resid  70.61564  S.E. of regression  0.616161 
R-squared  0.830451  Adjusted R-squared  0.829540 
F(1, 186)  911.0287  P-value(F)  1.35e-73 
Log-likelihood −174.7165  Akaike criterion  353.4331 




* indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
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